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3ABSTRACT
 The model presents a general equilibrium dynamic model of an economy
consisting of many regions. Capital is perfectly mobile and labor is immobile
across regions. Wages are determined by local unions. There is training on the
job and strategic complementarity between investment in physical capital by
firms and investment in becoming “trainable” by workers. Structurally similar
regional economies preserve forever their differences in per capita output and
employment rate, if the workers’ non-labor is equalized across regions by
interregional income redistribution operated via central budget. Regional
decentralization of income redistribution allows convergence in per capita
output and employment rate.
KEY WORDS: Growth, on-the-job training, skilled labor, strategic
complementarity, fiscal transfers.
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41  INTRODUCTION
The value added of the general equilibrium dynamic model presented in
this paper consists in combining unemployment theory and growth theory in
order to improve understanding of the relevant mechanisms through which
disparities in per capita output and employment rates may persist across
regions. In particular, the focus is on the role that interregional fiscal transfers
may play in the process of convergence in levels across regions. In this regard,
the paper can contribute to clarify the long-term implications of those programs
that redistribute income across regions or across countries of a union (or across
states of a union) via central budgets. Therefore, the conclusions of the paper
can be relevant for the debate on the merits of fiscal federalism and on the
degrees of centralization of redistribution both at the national and at the
supernational level.
The paper is strongly motivated by the recent experience of continental
Europe. In the last two decades, indeed, differences in GDP per capita between
European regions have appeared to be quite persistent (Neven and Gouyette,
1995; Fagerberg and Verspagen, 1996). Typically, regions with lower level of
5GDP per capita tend to be those having the higher rate of unemployment
(Caniëls et al., 1997), and regions which had the lowest unemployment rates at
the beginning of the 1980s still tend to have the lowest rates at the end of the
1990s (European Commission, 1999). Moreover, particularly in Southern
Europe -- where some of the regions with the highest unemployment rates are
located -- unemployment is closely concentrated among young people and
(especially in South Italy) among first-job seekers. However, in spite of long-
lasting (and rising) differentials in regional unemployment rates, interregional
migration flows have declined and then remained very low in the last two
decades:1 in contrast to the USA, where migration flows are important to
accommodate region-specific shocks (see Blanchard and Katz, 1992), the
adjustment pattern in countries like Italy and Germany seem to involve larger
and more persistent changes in labor-market participation (see Obstfeld and
Peri, 1998).2 As a result, it is often the case that depressed areas exhibit lower
rates of labor force participation and have relatively large underground
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 Since the mid 1970s labor flows across European regions have decreased rapidly, practically
coming to a stop in the last decade. In contrast, gross capital flows have grown considerably
during the same period.
6economies. Consistently with this picture, wages do not seem to be particularly
sensitive to local labor market imbalances.
It is often argued that generous transfers and (relatively) uniform social
benefits tend to disproportionally depress work incentives for residents in
poorer areas (e. g. Bertola, 2001), raising their reservation wages, discouraging
their labor-market participation and lowering their propensity to migrate. Many
observers consider East Germany and Southern Italy (the two “Mezzogiornos”)
as paradigmatic examples of these perverse effects.3 According to this view,
fiscal transfers aimed at reducing income differentials between areas
characterized by huge productivity differentials have to be considered among
the main culprit of the recent lack of any visible convergence in per capita
output between the two “Mezzogiornos” and the rest of their respective
countries: “In Germany, early retirement schemes, unemployment benefits,
retraining programmes and, in particular, social welfare, have to be mentioned,
which all have effectively increased the reservation wage and pulled parts of the
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 Also Decressin and Fatás (1995) find that in Europe regional demand shocks induce large
initial participation changes.
7labour force away from the regular labour markets. In Italy the situation is very
similar, but the emphasis is on different aspects of the welfare system” (Sinn
and Westermann, 2001, pp.57-58).
Since the present paper does not aim at studying the effects of a
particular aspect of the welfare system, but the overall impact of all those public
policies that directly or indirectly redistribute income across households located
in different regions, the model presented here assumes that the fiscal authorities
collect a fixed proportion of total output and redistribute in equal amount to all
the households. In this way, the paper allows to compare a framework in which
a centralized authority collects taxes and makes transfers nationwide (or in the
whole union) with a framework in which the transfers to the households living
in a certain region can be financed only by taxing the economic activities
located in that region. It is shown that convergence in per capita output and
employment rate among structurally similar regions characterized by different
initial conditions can occur only in the absence of interregional redistribution.
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 For a comparison between the two “Mezzogiornos”, see  Boltho et al. (1997), Sinn and
Westermann (2001).
8The paper is organized as it follows: section 2 discusses some features
of the model in the light of the relevant literature; section 3 presents the model;
section 4 characterizes the equilibrium path of the economy; section 5 shows
that regional disparities become permanent when there is interregional
redistribution; section 6 shows that regional disparities may disappear in the
long run when there is no interregional redistribution; section 7 concludes.
2  BACKGROUND
A strand of literature emphasizes that region policies and long-lasting
inflows of public resources to less developed regions “do not appear to enhance
the capacity of these regions, and hence offer no prospect that future transfers
will no longer be needed. Instead, they simply redistribute income. If income
distribution is a key concern, such transfers will therefore be needed in
perpetuity” ( Boldrin and Canova, 2001, p. 211). This is because they “facilitate
postponement of any necessary adjustment in labour force and relative prices”
(Obstfeld and Peri, 1998, p.242). Indeed, “even if inward transfers are initially
motivated by factors that are believed to be transitory, they will inherit
9persistence from the persistence of unemployment, and are likely themselves to
induce even greater persistence in unemployment, with further positive
feedback to transfers” ( Obstfeld and Peri, 1998, p.246).4 In brief, “open-ended
transfers…are not a mode of regional adjustment to permanent shocks. Instead
they finance regional non-adjustment indefinitely” ( Obstfeld and Peri, 1998,
p.211, italics in the original).
In other words, interregional fiscal transfers are deemed to prevent the
adjustment process suggested by the convergence hypothesis (Solow, 1956;
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992) form taking place: they eliminate (or
considerably reduce) the incentives inducing the reallocation of production
factors, which in the presence of non-increasing returns to scale are supposed to
gradually suppress the interregional differentials in the factors’ rates of return.
The effects of fiscal transfers on regional imbalances are studied in this
paper by taking capital mobility into consideration, differently from those
neoclassical growth models that are not well equipped to focus on regional
convergence because they assume a fully internal capital formation from
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 Hence, “the sharp distinction…between the redistribution and stabilization functions of fiscal
10
domestic savings. However, the model presented here abstracts from
interregional labor mobility, since the experience of the last decades makes
unrealistic to imagine that in Europe labor flows may play an important role in
the face of territorial disparities.
The other important feature that differentiates this paper from most
models explaining convergence or divergence is that the latter assume full
employment, thus having little to say about persistent interregional differences
in unemployment and labor force participation rates.  In contrast, the present
paper introduces a mechanism that tends to generate persistence in employment
rate differentials across structurally similar regions. Indeed, the existence of
long-lasting disparities prompts one to search for resources strategic for growth
whose endowments in a certain area depend on local history, since their
geographical mobility is somehow limited. This is particularly the case of those
assets embodied in human beings and in communities (informal and tacit
knowledge, social capital, moral and ethical values, etc.). In Europe, where
population mobility across regions is very low, some of these factors are more
                                                                                                                                            
transfers, while conceptually valid, is overdrawn in practice” ( Obstfeld and Peri, 1998, p.209).
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“quasi-fixed” than elsewhere. Therefore, the persistence-causing mechanism
formalized here emphasizes that the availability of experienced and trained
workers is not independent of history, because experience and training can be
acquired by working, and because there are important barriers to interregional
labor mobility. Thus, the existence in the past of jobs which offered
opportunities for acquiring experience and skills increases the endowment of
human capital currently existing in a region, thereby raising aggregate
productivity.5 In turn, the existence of an abundant supply of skilled labor
encourages firms’ investment in the area, thus giving rise to a virtuous circle.
But, even if formal education cannot substitute for learning by doing, it is a pre-
condition for it: possession of basic formal education is necessary to be able to
learn on the job.6 This implies that a certain investment is required of a worker
                                                     
5
  Empirical data seem to confirm the contribution made to total factor productivity by the
learning process which takes place when machinery and technologies are used (see, for
example, De Long and Summers, 1992). There is also empirical support for the hypothesis that
a shortage of qualified workers has negative effects on productivity growth (for
microeconometric evidence concerning the United Kingdom, see Haskel and Martin, 1996).
6
 This complementarity is supported by OECD (1991), which emphasizes that on average less
formal schooling seems to lead to more limited training opportunities and possibilities to
augment human capital. In the model, this strict complementarity is captured by assuming that a
worker can be hired by a good firm which gives him/her training on the job only if s/he has
12
so that s/he can become trainable on the job, or — more in general — so that
s/he can become “employable”. The expected return on this investment, and/or
on the implicit investment that a worker undertakes when s/he accepts a
relatively low entry-wage so as to receive training on the job, is increased by
the abundance of good job opportunities to which the worker can have access
once trained. In turn, the availability of an abundant supply of trainable labor
accentuates the firms’ propensity to invest in the area, thus reinforcing the
virtuous circle. Hence, a mechanism causing persistence (on-the-job training)
interacts with the presence of strategic complementary between investors’
decisions on (physical) capital accumulation and workers’ decisions on
investing to become employable.7
Even if there are forces pushing toward the perpetuation of regional
disparities, convergence in per capita output and employment rate across
regions may still be possible when the non-labor sources of income (the
                                                                                                                                            
invested in becoming trainable, i.e., if s/he has invested in order to participate actively in the
good job market.
7
 Among the models emphasizing the presence of strategic complementaries between
investment in physical capital, in R&D, or in job creation, on the one hand, and investment to
acquire the required human capital and to conduct a job search on the other, see Burdett and
Smith, 1995; Acemoglu, 1996; Redding, 1996; Snower, 1996.
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“outside option”) of the workers living in the poorer areas are lower than those
of the workers located in the richer areas. Indeed, this leads to lower wages in
the less developed regions, thus making these areas more attractive for
investment in (physical) capital.  This is why fiscal transfers and welfare
entitlements that tend to equalize the workers’ outside option across regions
may hinder the process of convergence.8 In this regard, the paper can contribute
to the debate on the geographical level at which wage bargaining should occur.
Indeed, it is shown that decentralizing the wage-setting process at the local level
is not sufficient to differentiate wages according to local labor-market
conditions,9 if fiscal transfers and welfare entitlements equalize the outside
option of workers living in areas characterized by different levels of GDP per
capita and employment rates. Hence, on this issue, the conclusions of the paper
support the position of those who argue that decentralized bargaining would not
help very much unless the social system is reformed.(e.g. Sinn and
Westermann, 2001).
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 Fiscal transfers and taxes affect employment by changing the ratio between the income
conditional on working and the income conditional on non working (see Phelps, 1997;
Pissarides, 1998).
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The model also limits its analysis to regions that are structurally similar,
i.e., that  share the same parameter values and differ only with respect to their
initial levels of per capita income and employment rates. This is consistent with
the viewpoint according to which it is “reasonable to look for convergence or
divergence only among regions that are relatively similar to each other, if not in
territorial size at least in the composition of their natural endowment,
population, location, geographical structure, climate, access to natural
resources, political regimes and so on” ( Boldrin and Canova, 2001, p.212).
Following this philosophy, the analysis is limited to the case in which the
fraction of GDP that is redistributed is equal across regions, even when income
transfers to residents in a certain region can be financed only through the taxes
collected within that region. This allows to focus exclusively on the long-term
implications of the geographical level (central versus local) at which income
redistribution occurs, leaving apart the question concerning the long-term
effects of changes in the fraction of GDP that is redistributed via fiscal policies.
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 For a model showing that centralized wage-setting should be discouraged and skilled labor
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3  THE MODEL
In the infinite-horizon economy under consideration, there are firms
(that produce by renting physical capital), investors (that are the owners of the
productive assets) and workers (that consume their entire income). The
economy consists of J regions, J≥2. All regions share the same structural and
institutional features: they are assumed to have the same parameter values and
modalities of wage determination. Thus, the regions may differ only with
respect to their initial conditions.
Population’s dynamics
Time is discrete, and individuals are finitely lived: they have a strictly
positive and constant probability σ (0<σ<1) of dying in each period t. Thus, the
probability of dying in a certain period is assumed to be independent of the age
of the individual; and it is also assumed that the mortality rate of each large
group of individuals does not fluctuate stochastically even though each
individual' s lifespan is uncertain. This implies that at the end of t a constant
fraction σ of individuals living in region j dies, while a new cohort is born at the
                                                                                                                                            
mobility should be favoured in order to foster regional convergence, see Faini (1999).
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beginning of the following period. Assuming that ξ (0<ξ<1) is the birth rate, the
workers’ population P jt evolves in each region according to
Pjt+1=Pjt(1-ξ+σ),  Pj0 given ∀j.             (1)
The firms
In each region, there is a continuum--of measure n>0--of locations. In
each location i∈[0,n] there is a large number (normalized to be one) of identical
firms. Locations differ with respect to the specific shock affecting them in each
period. Indeed, in each period t the representative firm located in i produces
some amount of Yt, which is the unique good produced in this economy (the
numéraire of the system), according to the constant-returns-to-scale technology
  1,0 1,0  ,)A(SKxY jitjit-1jititjit <Ω<<<Ω+= ααα                  (2)
where xit is a random variable taking a value in t which is specific to the i
location, Kjit is the physical capital that the i firm borrowed at the beginning of
t to carry out production, Sjit are the experienced workers (the "skilled
workers") employed by the i firm in t, Ajit are the newly hired workers (the
"apprentices") of the i firm in t. Note that the apprentices are less productive
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than the experienced workers (Ω<1), and that aggregate output in region j is
given by  Yjt= ∫n
0
jitdiY .
The random variable xit is assumed to be uniformly distributed on the
interval [0,n]. Moreover, it is identically distributed across locations and
periods, and independently distributed across periods. In each t, xit takes a
different value in each location, with xit varying continuously across locations.
This implies that the average value of xit across locations is not a random
variable and does not fluctuate in time, even though individual firms are
uncertain about their local xit (no aggregate uncertainty).10
Assuming that there is a tax on output, the period net profits njitpi  (after
taxes and net of the cost of capital) of the i firm are given by:
10  ,K)(r- jittgjitnjit <<+= δδpipi ,               (3)
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 In other words, if 
n
KK jtjit = , n
SS jtjit =  and n
AA jtjit =  ∀i, then
αα )$S(K2nY jtjt
-1
jtjt += .
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where 10   ,Ae-Sv-Y)-1( jitjitjitjitjitgjit <<= ττpi , are the firm' s gross profits, τ is
the (fixed) tax rate, vjit is the real wage paid by the i firm to the skilled workers
employed in t, ejit is the entry wage paid by the i firm to the apprentices hired in
t, δ is a capital depreciation parameter, and rt is the (real) interest rate, i.e. the
market rate at which firms borrowed capital at the beginning of period t. Interest
payment and reimbursement of principal are due at the end of t. The interest
rate is unique because capital is perfectly mobile across regions and locations at
the beginning of each period, while mobility is infinitely costly within the
period: once borrowed and installed at the beginning of t, a firm' s capital stock
must remain fixed until the end of t.
The investors
There is a large number (normalized to be one) of identical investors
who are the firms' o wners: for simplicity and without loss of generality, it is
assumed that all investors are entitled to receive an equal share of the firms' n et
profits. Being the owners of the firms’ productive assets, investors must decide
in each t what fraction of their gross returns on wealth to spend on consumption
19
rather than on buying productive assets to be lent at the beginning of t+1 to
firms. Hence, the problem of the representative investor amounts to deciding a
contingency plan for consumption intC  and holding of productive assets Kt+1 in
order to maximize his/her lifetime expected sequence of discounted period
utilities:
∑∞
=
≥
0t
-1in
tt 0,  ,
-1
)C( ζζθ
ζ
θ≡γ(1-σ),  0<γ≤1,      (4)
subject to ntttint1t K)r1(CK pi++≤++ ,  K0 given, ∑∫
=
=
J
1j
n
0
n
jit
n
t i dpipi .
In (4), ζ is the relative-risk-aversion parameter, γ is a time-preference parameter
and ntpi
 
are aggregate (net) profits. Expectations are rational, in the sense that
they are consistent with the model and are generated by optimally processing
the available information. Since there is uncertainty only at the local level,
investors have perfect foresight on the behavior of aggregate variables. It is also
worth to note that it is immaterial where the investors are located, since there is
a single market for capital and a single market for the only good produced in
20
this J-regions economy (no transportation cost). Finally -- for simplicity and
without loss of generality – it is ruled out the existence of actuarially fair
annuities paid to the living investors by a financial institution collecting their
wealth as they die: the wealth of someone who dies is inherited by some newly
born individual  (accidental bequests).
The skilled workers
Skilled workers are those who have been trained on the job while
working in a  firm for at least one period. In contrast, apprentices are workers
with no work experience in the formal economy, but who have been hired by a
firm after having invested to acquire the required basic knowledge. In their
working lives, workers never lose the general skills that they have acquired.
Being general, the skills acquired on the job are perfectly transferable.
However, it is assumed that interregional labor mobility is infinitely costly.
Thus, the skilled labor force evolves in each region according to
Mjt+1=(1-σ)(Mjt+Ajt), ∫= n
0
jitjt iMM d , Mj0 given ∀j, ∫= n
0
jitjt iAA d , (5)
where Mjit are the skilled workers of region j located in i during period t.
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As in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), workers choose location (within
their region) ex ante (at the beginning of each t), while firms decide on labor
input once uncertainty is resolved. As for capital, labor is perfectly mobile
across locations (of the same region) at the beginning of each period t, while
mobility across locations is infinitely costly within one period.11
Once located in i, a skilled worker has the following period expected
utility:
1, 0,'' 0,'  )],w()p-1()vw(p[Eu jtjitjitjtjittskjit >≤>++= ηη uuuu  (6)
where Et is an expectation operator conditional on the information available in t
as the realization of xit is not yet known, wjt is the workers’ non-labor income
(namely the  monetized value of the welfare entitlements and government
transfers made to all workers of region j), and pjit is the fraction of the skilled
workforce located in i that is employed in t:



≤
=
otherwise.
MS  if  
M
S
p
   1
jitjit
jit
jit
jit              (7)
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 This short-term immobility implies that in period t a worker located in i does not work at all
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Finally, η>1 captures the fact that an unemployed worker can enjoy more
leisure (and/or undertake some activity in the informal segment of the labor
market).
At the beginning of each period, a skilled worker decides in what
location to stay (within his/her region). Obviously, s/he locates where s/he can
expect to enjoy the highest lifetime utility. Therefore, the discounted sequence
of utilities that an optimizing skilled worker can expect (before the realization
of xit) to gain in the rest of his/her lifetime is given by
=
sk
jtU
sk
1jt
sk
t*ji Uu ++ φ ,  φ≡β(1-σ), 0<β<1.         (8)
In (8), β is a time-preference parameter, and i* is the location where a skilled
worker living in region j can have the best prospects (a "best location"):12
i.  uu skjit
sk
tji* ∀≥
The trainable workers
An investment in human capital at the beginning of period t in order to
become “trainable” (or “employable” in the formal segment of the labor market)
                                                                                                                                            
in the formal economy if s/he is not employed in that period by a firm of i.
12
 More than one location can share this status of best location.
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yields a strictly positive probability of being employed by a firm only in that
period, since the basic knowledge acquired by a person is dissipated if it is not
used on the job. Moreover, possession of the basic knowledge required by the
firms has no value in the informal economy. Hence, the investment made in
order to participate in the formal labor market will be lost, if within one period,
the worker does not find an entry job paid at least as his/her reservation wage:
after having invested in human capital, a trainable worker will accept any job
offer paying an entry wage larger than his/her reservation wage minjite . Finally,
also a trainable worker decides to stay in that location within his/her region
where s/he can expect to enjoy the highest lifetime utility. Thus, the discounted
sequence of utilities that an optimizing trainable worker can expect (before the
realization of xit) to gain in the rest of his/her lifetime is given by
{ }]U)w()[q-1(]U)ew([qEU un 1jtjtt*jisk 1jtt*jijtt*jittrjt ++ ++++= φηφ uu . (9)
In (9), un 1jtU +  is the discounted sequence of utilities that an optimizing unskilled
worker still alive at the beginning of t+1 can expect to get in the rest of his/her
lifetime, )U-(U-)w()e(w)e(w un 1jtsk 1jtjtminjtjtjitjt ++≡+≥+ φηuuu , i* is a best
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location for a trainable worker living in region j,13 and qjit is the fraction of the
trainable workforce located in i that is hired in period t:



≤
=
otherwise,
LA  if  
L
A
q
   1
jitjit
jit
jit
jit               (10)
where Ljit is the trainable workforce located in i.
The unskilled workers
At the beginning of each period, an unskilled worker must decide
whether to incur the utility loss associated with participation in the formal labor
market (i.e., with the acquisition of the basic knowledge required by the firms
operating in the formal economy)14 or to remain out of the formal labor market:
an unskilled worker can be hired by a firm only if s/he becomes trainable. An
unskilled worker who decides not to invest in human capital has the same
lifetime prospects as a trainable worker who does not find an entry job after
                                                     
13 { }≥++++ ++ ]U)w()[q-1(]U)ew([qE un 1jtjtt*jisk 1jtt*jijtt*jit φηφ uu{ } i  ]U)w()[q-1(]U)ew([qE un 1jtjtjitsk 1jtjitjtjitt ∀++++≥ ++ φηφ uu .
14
 Alternatively, one may interpret this disutility as due to the direct and indirect costs of
searching an entry job in the formal segment of the labor market.
25
having incurred the utility loss entailed by this investment. Therefore, an
optimizing unskilled worker can expect at the beginning of t to get the lifetime
discounted sequence of utilities associated with the best available alternative:
}{
 U)w( ,Uc)(-maxU un 1jtjttrjtunjt +++= φηuh , h’>0,        (11)
where  -h(c),  captures the disutility of acquiring the required basic knowledge
(c is the monetized value of this disutility).
Wage determination
 An insider-outsider scenario is considered. In each location, the wages
are determined by negotiations held at the beginning of every period between a
local union unconcerned about the interests of workers with no work experience
and the local employers' association. In this context, it is immaterial whether the
unions are only concerned about the workers employed in the previous period,
or about both the latter and those experienced workers who were laid off in
previous periods. In fact, even if the wage setters do not care about the interests
of the skilled workers on layoff, the latter put pressure on them, insofar as they
are perfect substitutes and thereby reduce the job security of the employed.
26
The union operating in i negotiates the real wage that all the firms of i
must pay to the experienced workers in employment, while each individual firm
takes its decisions on the demand for labor and capital in full autonomy. This
negotiation also concerns the entry wage, which is established as the fixed
fraction µ of the skilled workers' wage that firms must pay to the apprentices
(ejit=µvjit). It is realistic to assume that the union does not allow the wage
differential between skilled workers and apprentices fully to offset their
productivity differential (Ω<µ≤1), so that any incentive for the employers to
replace experienced workers with apprentices is suppressed.15
The bargaining process can be represented as if each union unilaterally
sets the real wage in the awareness of its impact on the local firms' d ecisions.
On the other hand, each union is aware that the effects of its wage policy on the
economy as a whole is negligible. Similarly, each single firm perceives that its
decisions on labor and capital input cannot influence the wage setting process
because their impact is insignificant relatively to the size of the local labor
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 Burdett and Smith (1995) emphasize that the key assumption for the existence of a low skill
trap is that an employer' s profit flow is greater when employing a skilled worker than when
employing an unskilled worker. Indeed, the fact that firms lay off unskilled workers before
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market. Since the real wage, once negotiated, remains fixed for a certain lapse
of time (a "period"), it is reasonable to assume that the wage is set by the union
before the realization of the random variable that is relevant for that period.
Within this decentralized wage setting, in each t the local union
operating in i must solve the following problem:
sk
1jt
sk
jit
v
Uu  max
jit
++ φ .        (12)
In each period the union has full control only over the current wage, if we
maintain that current union membership cannot commit the workers who will
manage the union in the future to the pursuit of policies not optimal from their
own temporal perspective. In other words, a wage policy is feasible only if it is
time consistent. Hence, the union' s problem can be decomposed into a sequence
of similar problems that can be solved recursively.
Redistributive policies
We consider two possible institutional setups for income redistribution.
                                                                                                                                            
skilled workers is difficult to reconcile with the contention that unskilled workers are more
profitable.
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In the first one, there is a centralized fiscal authority that collects taxes
throughout the economy and provides the same welfare benefit for all workers
living in the economy (interregional redistribution):
w1t = w2t =…= wJt=wt=
∑
∑
=
=
J
1j
jt
J
1j
jt
P
Yτ
.  (13a)
In the alternative scenario, in each region there is a fiscal authority
collecting taxes within the region and providing the same welfare benefit for all
workers living in that region (no interregional redistribution):
wjt =τYjt/ Pjt.    (13b)
A summary of the timing of events
Summarizing, in each t we have a sequence of events in the following
order: i) a new cohort enters the economy; ii) unskilled workers decide whether
to invest in order to become trainable; iii) firms borrow physical capital for
carrying out production, the workers decide where to locate; iv) unions set the
wage; v) idiosynchratic shocks occur; vi) firms atomistically determine their
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demand for skilled workers and apprentices, production takes place, apprentices
are trained on the job, taxes are collected and transfers payments are made; vii)
firms reimburse the principal and pay the interest on the capital borrowed at the
beginning of the period, firms also pay the dividends to the shareholders,
investors decide what fraction of their income to save, a fraction σ  of each
group of population dies at the end of the period.
4 CHARACTERIZATION OF AN EQUILIBRIUM PATH
Equilibrium conditions in the  markets for product and physical capital
One can easily derive the conditions for equilibrium both in the product
market and in the market for productive assets:
∑∑
=
+
=
++=+
J
1j
w
jt
in
t1tt
J
1j
jt CCK)K-1(Y δ ,          (14a)
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where ∫ ++= n
0
jitjitjitjitjtjt
w
jt i)AeS(vwPC d  is the consumption of the workers
living in j.
Firms' optimality condition for capital accumulation
Firms of i determine their demand for capital at the beginning of t by
satisfying the optimality condition
δ
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E ,  kjit≡Kjit/Mjit, sjit≡Ljit/Mjit,   (15)
where the firms’ (gross) profit function pig(.) is given in (A3).
This optimality condition defines kjit, that is the physical capital/skilled
labor ratio in the firms of i, as an implicit function of the trainable labor/skilled
labor ratio of i, the wage and the interest rate:
f(kjit, sjit, vjit)=rt+δ,   f1 <0,  f2>0 and  f3<0,         (16)
31
where 
{ }
ααα
α
τα
ταα
µα
jit
-
jit
-2
jit
2
jit
22
jit
k)s1(2
)n-)(1-1(
)k-)(1-(22n
1-])s(1-1[)/()v-1((.)
Ω+
+
Ω+Ω
=
−
f  and
vjit is determined by the union operating in i according to the time-invariant
wage rule (see the Appendix)
vjit=v(kjit,wjt),  vk>0, vw >0. (17)
The lifetime well-being of a skilled worker along an equilibrium path
Using (17) and (A5), one can obtain the equation governing the
equilibrium path of the lifetime well-being of a skilled worker:
sk
1jtjtjtjtjt
sksk
jt U)w,k),w,(k(U ++= φvu ,        (18)
where the subscripts denoting the location are dropped. Indeed, an equilibrium
pair { } { }( )∞∞
0jt0jt k,s  satisfying (16)-(18) and (A7) depends on structural
parameters assumed to be equal across locations and on exogenously given
trajectory of rt and wjt. Therefore, different locations belonging to the same
region display equal physical capital/skilled labor and trainable labor/skilled
labor ratios. Hence, local unions operating in the same region are induced to set
the same wage in all locations of the region, and workers can be indifferent (ex
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ante) among locations belonging to the same region, expecting the same well-
being everywhere.16
Using (A7), one can rewrite (18) as
Ψ(sjt+1,kjt+1,wjt+1,sjt,kjt,wjt)=0, (19)
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Determination of the equilibrium interest rate
One can determine the time profile of the interest rate by solving the
problem of the investors. The investors’ optimal plan must satisfy:
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Along an equilibrium trajectory, one has:
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 In other words, the equilibrium solution is symmetric across locations.
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along an equilibrium trajectory, the skilled workforce evolves according to 
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where 
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Finally, along an equilibrium trajectory, one has:
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5 THE EQUILIBRIUM PATH WITH INTERREGIONAL
REDISTRIBUTION
Considering that according to (13a) w1t=w2t=…= w Jt=wt, one has
s1t=s2t=…= =s Jt=st and k1t=k2t=…=k Jt=kt ∀t. Hence, one can use  (23) to write
(13a) as
,
2
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≡ is the skilled labor-workers’ population ratio of the entire
economy. Equation (24) allows to implicitly define wt as a function of kt, st and
bt:
wt=w(kt,st,bt).  (25)
Moreover, the ratio bt evolves according to
χ(bt+1,bt,kt,wt,st)= 0)-1(
)]s,w,k(1[b-b tttt1t =+
+
+ ξσ
ρ
, b0 given, (26)
where ρ(.) is given by (22).
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Considering that w1t=w2t=…=w Jt=wt, s1t=s2t=…=s Jt=st and
k1t=k2t=…=k Jt=kt ∀t, one can use (21)-(22) to rewrite (20a) as
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Given equations (16), (17) and (27), the condition for equilibrium in the capital
market becomes
Φ(kt+2,st+1,kt+1,wt+1,st,k t,wt)=f(kt+1,st+1,v(kt+1,wt+1))+1-δ-
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One can use (25) to substitute for wt in (19), (26) and (28), thus
obtaining the system of difference equations in kt, st and bt that governs the
general equilibrium path of the economy under fiscal centralism. Along this
path, the following proposition holds:
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Proposition 1 In the presence of interregional redistribution (fiscal centralism),
initial differentials across regions in per capita output and employment rates
are preserved forever even if these regional economies are structurally similar
(i.e., even if they have the same parameter values).
To verify that Proposition 1 holds, consider that along an equilibrium path the
per capita output of region j is given by
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and the employment rate of region j is given by
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This ratio evolves according to
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37
where kt, st and bt are governed by (19), (26) and (28). It is apparent that if
bj0≠bz0, j≠z, then bjt≠bzt ∀t, entailing non convergence across regions in per
capita output and employment rates.
6 THE EQUILIBRIUM PATH WITHOUT INTERREGIONAL
REDISTRIBUTION
The general equilibrium path under fiscal decentralization
Considering (13b) and (23), one has
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Equation (31) allows to implicitly define wjt as a function of kjt, sjt and bjt:
wjt=w(kjt,sjt,bjt).  (32)
Moreover, the ratio bjt evolves according to
χ(bjt+1,bjt,kjt,wjt,sjt)= 0)-1(
)]s,w,k(1[
b-b jtjtjtjt1jt =
+
+
+ ξσ
ρ
, bj0 given ∀j,     (33)
where ρ(.) is given by (22).
One can use (21)-(22) to rewrite (20a) as
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Given equations (16), (17) and (34), the condition for equilibrium in the capital
market becomes
Θ(k1t+2,s1t+1,k1t+1,w1t+1,s1t,k1t,w1t,M1t,k2t+2,s2t+1,k2t+1,w2t+1,s2t,k2t,w2t,M2t,
…,
 kJt+2,sJt+1,kJt+1,wJt+1,sJt,kJt,wJt,MJt)=0,   (35)
where Θ(.)=f(kjt+1,sjt+1,v(kjt+1,wjt+1))+1-δ-
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according to (22).
One can use (32) to substitute for wjt in (19), (22), (33) and (35), thus
obtaining the system of difference equations in kjt, sjt and bjt and Mjt that
governs the general equilibrium path of the economy.
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The balanced growth path (BGP) under fiscal decentralization
Along a BGP, one must have kjt+1=kjt=kj, sjt+1=sjt=sj and bjt+1=bjt=bj in
(19), (22), (33) and (35). It is apparent by inspecting (33) that this entails
1+ρ(kj,wj,sj)=1-σ+ξ . Hence,  along a BGP, equation (35) reduces to
f(kj,sj,v(kj,w(kj,sj,bj)))+1-δ=(1-σ+ξ)ζθ-1 and equation (22) can be rewritten as
Mjt+1=Mjt(1-σ+ξ). Therefore, a steady-state triple (kj,sj,bj) can be obtained by
solving (19), (33) and (35) for kjt+1=kjt=kj, sjt+1=sjt=sj and bjt+1=bjt=bj. Thus,
the following proposition holds:
Proposition 2 In the absence of interregional redistribution (fiscal
decentralization), structurally similar regions are characterized by the same
steady-state levels of per capita output and employment rate.
To verify that Proposition 2 holds, consider that along a BGP the per capita
output of region j is given by
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and the employment rate of region j is given by
40
)]s,k)),b,s,(k(ks)k)),b,s,(k(k[b
P
AS
jjjjj,jjjjjj,jj
jt
jtjt
wq(vwp(v +=+ .    (36b)
Noting that the steady-state levels of per capita output and employment rate in
region j depend only on the steady-state triple (kj,sj,bj), which in its turn
depends only on the parameter values (that are assumed to be equal across
regions), it is apparent that Proposition 2 holds.
Moreover, it is worth to note that if there is more than one steady-state
triple (kj,sj,bj) satisfying (19), (33) and (35) for kjt+1=kjt=kj, sjt+1=sjt=sj and
bjt+1=bjt=bj, then  along a BGP structurally similar regions may exhibit
different per capita output and employment rate. Conversely, the existence of a
unique (kj,sj,bj) implies that along a BGP structurally similar regions must
necessarily exhibit the same per capita output and employment rate.
Considering parameter values that rule out the possibility of multiple (kj,sj,bj),
one can produce numerical examples showing that the system obtained by
linearizing the difference equations governing the equilibrium path of the
regional economies around its (unique) BGP exhibits saddle-path stability (see
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the Appendix). This implies that for these parameter values the following
proposition holds:
Proposition 3 In the absence of interregional redistribution (fiscal
decentralization), structurally similar regions whose initial per capita output
and employment rate are not too far away from their steady-state values
converge to the same per capita output and employment rate.
This proposition is a consequence of the fact that along a BGP structurally
similar regions have the same per capita output and employment rate, together
with the fact that in a neighborhood of the BGP the linear approximation of the
system governing the equilibrium path of the economy is saddle-path stable.
7 CONCLUSIONS
This paper shows that a system of centralized income redistribution can
perpetuate the differentials in output per capita and employment rate across
regions. This is because redistributive programs providing equal transfer
payments and welfare entitlements to households living in areas that differ in
GDP per head and productivity levels tend to equalize the non-labor income of
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the workers, thus influencing the process of wage determination. Indeed, in the
presence of interregional redistribution, the wages cannot fully reflect the
differences in per capita productivity among the different areas, even if the
wage-setting process is decentralized. In this respect, an implication of the
paper is that decentralized wage determination is not sufficient to insure
convergence in per capita output and employment rate across regions. It would
be also possible to show that even with competitive labor markets the
combination of labor immobility and centralized income redistribution prevents
the interregional differentials to vanish in time.17 Especially for Europe, where it
is not realistic to expect a resumption of significant interregional labor flows,
this conclusion may support the argument that  both at national levels and at the
level of the European Union there is a trade off  between social policies aimed
at providing all citizens with the same basic entitlements and the elimination of
regional disparities in GDP per head and employment rate.   
                                                     
17
 See Bonatti (1999). In other words -- differently than in Perotti (2001) – the existence of
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APPENDIX
1. Derivation of the firms’ (gross) profit function pig(.)
Given the perfectly transferable nature of the general skills acquired by an
apprentice, each employer is aware that there is no guarantee that a newly hired
worker will remain with his/her firm in the future. This is why an employer
does not consider the future returns accruing from the on-the-job training of an
apprentice: since the forthcoming benefit of adding a skilled worker to the stock
of human capital available to the economy as a whole cannot be appropriated
privately, the employer can ignore it as an insignificant externality. Therefore,
the selection of the optimal labor policies by a firm amounts in each t to solving
the static decision problem of maximizing (3) with respect to Sjit and Ajit.
Given its optimal labor policies, a firm is able to determine at the beginning of t
the amount of Kjit to borrow and install. As the local shock is favorable, the
aggregate demand for either trained labor or apprentices by firms in location i
may be rationed. In the aggregate, it is always the case that:
Sjit≤ Mjit,       (A1a)
Ajit≤ Ljit.       (A1b)
When labor demand happens to be rationed, it is reasonable to assume that the
scarce supply of labor is evenly distributed among firms of the same location.
Note that the union wages are not determined at the firm level and that
employers cannot compete for labor in short supply by raising the relevant
                                                                                                                                            
noncompetitive labor markets is not essential in this model.
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wages in order to keep and poach workers, even if skills are perfectly
transferable among firms (see Soskice, 1990). Therefore, with one as the
normalized number of firms of location i, we can take (A1) to be the constraints
faced by each individual firm as the union wages induce all the available skilled
and trainable workers to accept a job offer. Hence, the firm' s choice of the labor
inputs amounts to solving the static decision problem of maximizing (3) subject
to (2) and (A1), from which one can derive the optimal labor policies:
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The firms' n et profits are an increasing function of xit. In fact, using (2), (3) and
(A2), one has:
pig=pi(Mjit,kjit,sjit,vjit,xit),    (A3)
where
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2. Derivation of the equilibrium condition for the trainable labor market and of
the wage rule
Having the optimal demand for skilled labor in (A2a), one can compute the
probability of a skilled worker located in i (before the realization of xit ) to be
employed in period t:
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By using (6) and (A4), one can write the period utility expected (before the
realization of xit ) by a skilled worker located in i:
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Similarly, one can use (A2b) to compute the probability that a trainable worker
located in i (before the realization of xit) will be hired in period t:
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Note that q(.) diminishes as there is a larger number of trainable workers,
remaining constant both the size of the skilled workforce and the stock of
capital located in i. In equilibrium, the number of unskilled workers who
become trainable in location i must be such that an unskilled worker is
indifferent between investing in basic knowledge or staying in the informal
economy:
)]U-U()w(-)vw()[s,k,v(c)( un 1jtsk 1jtjtjitjtjitjitjit ++++= φηµ uuqh ,       (A7a)
where along an equilibrium path
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1jtjt
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jt U)w(=U ++ φηu .   (A7b)
The period utility function of a skilled worker depends on the real wage, on the
government transfers and on the physical capital/skilled labor ratio, which is a
predetermined variable when an union sets the wage. Given the forward looking
behavior of firms and unskilled workers, the current wage policy of an union
could affect the union’s future policy and the utility of its members only if it
had a significant impact on the investors’ behavior and on the future income
transfers in favor of the workers. However, this is not the case because of the
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continuum of unions operating in each region. Thus, the problem of a single
union amounts to solve the following sequence of static problems:
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u ,               (A8)
from which one obtains the following sequence of first-order conditions:
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defining implicitly the time-invariant wage rule (17).
3 Uniqueness and local stability of the BGP under fiscal decentralization
From the fact that along a BGP one has 1+ρ(kj,wj,sj)=1-σ+ξ, one can derive
from (22) and (A6) the following two equations that must be satisfied along a
BGP:
q(vj,kj,sj) = ξ[ sj (1-σ)]-1 , jj-1 s s)-(1 ≤≤σξ ,      (A10)
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where js  is that value of sj above which  in no location and in no period one
may have shortage of trainable labor.18
                                                     
18
 Thus, js  is that value of sj satisfying 1]-)s[(1)-2]()-1(-s[)s(1 -2j-1j-1j αα ασξ Ω+=ΩΩ+ .
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By specifying a CRRA utility function for the workers 
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equations (A9) and (A11) allow to determine the steady-state value of wjt as a
function of kj and sj:
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where -1j )-1(s σξ>  is that value of sj at which g(sj)=0.19
Since along a BGP (35) reduces to
f(kj,sj,vj) =δ-1+(1-σ+ξ)ζθ-1,      (A13)
one can use (16) and (A11) to rewrite (A13) as kj=Γ(sj), where
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Similarly, since along a BGP (19) reduces to
)w,k,v()w(-)-1)(vw()s,k,v(
c)()-1(
jtj
sk
jjj
jjj
uuu
q
h φηφµφ ++= ,        (A15)
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one can use (A10), (A11) and (A12) to rewrite (A15) as kj=Λ(sj), where
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Along a BGP one must have Γ(sj)=Λ(sj). A sufficient condition for having a
unique BGP is that Γ’≤0 and  Λ’>0, jjj sss ≤≤ . As a numerical example, let
ζ=ϕ=0, ξ=σ=0.05, µ=0.52, Ω=0.5, η=1.25, τ=0.4, δ=0.1, φ=θ=0.9, α=2/3,
h(c)=0.1949722 and n=1. One can check that with these parameter values Γ’≤0
and Λ’>0, 92405.0ss1774441.0s jjj =≤≤= . Moreover, given these
parameter values, the unique BGP is characterized by  2.0s*j = ,
2276078.0k*j = , 61936.0b
*
j = , 1702564.0v*j =  and 0595213.0w*j = .
To check that these parameter values are consistent with the saddle-path
stability of the system obtained by linearizing the difference equations that
govern the motion of the economy in a neighborhood of its BGP, one should
note that with  ζ=0 the equilibrium path can be characterized by two difference
equations in kjt and sjt. Indeed, with ζ=0 equation (35) reduces to
{ }
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Moreover, since with ϕ=0 the wage rule (17) is
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vjt=v(kjt,wjt)= 2
1)w-()k-)(1-(2n jt-1jt ηταα α +
,        (A18)
one can use (A17) and (A18) to write wjt as a function of kjt and sjt:
)s,k(w jtjtjt ς= ,                          (A19)
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Finally, considering (31), one can use (A17) and (A19) to write bjt as a function
of kjt and sjt:
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Given (A19) and (A20), the economy of each region is governed by the
following system of difference equations in kjt and sjt:
 Ψ(sjt+1,kjt+1, )s,k( 1jt1jt ++ς ,sjt,kjt, )s,k( jtjtς )=0,              (A21)
χ(b(kjt+1,sjt+1), b(kjt,sjt),kjt, )s,k( jtjtς ,sjt)=0,                      (A22)
where Ψ(.) and χ(.) are given, respectively, by (19) and (33).
Linearizing (A21)-(A22) around ( 2.0s*j = , 2276078.0k*j = ), one can derive
the following characteristic equation of the linearized system:
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λ2-1.9511209λ+0.925374=0, where λ1=1.1378687 and λ2=0.8132522 are the
solving characteristic roots, implying saddle-path stability.
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